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Abstract 
Deciding how much evidence to accumulate before making a decision is a problem we and 
other animals often face, but one which is not completely understood. This issue is 
particularly important because a tendency to sample less information (often known as 
reflection impulsivity) is a feature in several psychopathologies, such as psychosis. A formal 
understanding information sampling may therefore clarify the computational anatomy of 
psychopathology. In this theoretical paper, we consider evidence accumulation in terms of 
active (Bayesian) inference using a generic model of Markov decision processes. Here, 
agents are equipped with beliefs about their own behaviour – in this case, that they will 
make informed decisions. Normative decision-making is then modelled using variational 
Bayes to minimise surprise about choice outcomes. Under this scheme, different facets of 
belief updating map naturally onto the functional anatomy of the brain (at least at a 
heuristic level). Of particular interest is the key role played by the expected precision of 
beliefs about control, which we have previously suggested may be encoded by 
dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain. We show that manipulating expected precision 
strongly affects how much information an agent characteristically samples, and thus 
provides a possible link between impulsivity and dopaminergic dysfunction. Our study 
therefore represents a step towards understanding evidence accumulation in terms of 
neurobiologically plausible Bayesian inference, and may cast light on why this process is 
disordered in psychopathology. 
 
Keywords: active inference ∙ evidence accumulation ∙ Bayesian ∙ bounded rationality ∙ free 
energy ∙ inference ∙ utility theory ∙ dopamine ∙ schizophrenia 
 3 
Introduction 
This paper considers the nature of evidence accumulation in terms of active (Bayesian) 
inference using the urn or beads task (Huq et al., 1988; Moritz and Woodward, 2005). In 
particular, we cast decision-making in terms of prior beliefs an agent entertains about its 
own behaviour. In brief, we equip agents with the prior belief that they will make informed 
decisions and then sample their choices from posterior beliefs that accumulate evidence 
from successive observations. In this paper, we focus on the formal aspects of this (Bayes) 
optimal evidence accumulation – using a generic scheme that has been applied previously 
to limited offer and trust games (Friston et al., 2013; Moutoussis et al., 2014; 
Schwartenbeck et al., 2014). This scheme is based upon approximate Bayesian inference 
using variational Bayes. Importantly, the neurobiological correlates of belief updating 
implicit in this model can be linked to various aspects of neuroanatomy and, possibly, 
dopaminergic discharges. In what follows, we introduce the particular generative model 
that underlies evidence accumulation in the urn task and show how the ensuing 
performance depends upon key model parameters, like decision criteria and precision of – 
or confidence in – beliefs about choices. 
Evidence accumulation, in its various forms, has been the subject of much interest in 
cognitive neuroscience (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Yang and Shadlen, 2007; Moutoussis et al., 
2011; Hunt et al., 2012). Incorporating it within the broader framework of Bayes-optimal 
inference is of intrinsic interest particularly with respect to pathological conditions 
characterized by increased 'reflection impulsivity' (a decreased sampling of evidence prior to 
making a decision; (Kagan, 1966)). This has been much researched in schizophrenia, where 
abnormal behaviour often includes increased reflection impulsivity (Huq et al., 1988; Garety 
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et al., 1991; Fear and Healy, 1997; Moritz and Woodward, 2005; Clark et al., 2006; Averbeck 
et al., 2011; Moutoussis et al., 2011). It is, however also important in other conditions such 
drug abuse, Parkinson's disease and frontal lobe lesions (Djamshidian et al., 2012; Lunt et 
al., 2012; Averbeck et al., 2013). By varying the parameters of the generative model 
entertained by the agent, our approach allows us to consider how inter-individual 
differences can arise in the context of approximately optimal inference – and to generate 
hypotheses relating behavioural abnormalities to underlying neuropathology (it also allows 
us to recover the underlying parameters governing observed behaviour). In particular, as 
disorders such as schizophrenia, Parkinson's disease and drug abuse are characterised by 
aberrant dopaminergic function (Dagher and Robbins, 2009; Howes and Kapur, 2009), we 
focus on the effects of varying expected precision (which we assume to be encoded by 
dopamine) on reflection impulsivity.  
We have chosen to focus on the urn task as a simple paradigm that emphasises evidence 
accumulation and has been used extensively to study impulsivity – especially in 
schizophrenia research. In the urn task, subjects are told that the urn contains beads or balls 
that are largely of one colour. The subject is allowed to make successive draws to decide 
which colour predominates. In the draws to decision version of the task, the subject has to 
answer as soon as they are certain. In the probability estimates version, the subject can 
continue to draw and change their answer. Interestingly, delusional patients ‘jump to 
conclusions’ in the first version, while they are more willing to revise their decision in light of 
contradictory evidence in the second (Garety and Freeman, 1999). Jumping to conclusions 
may reflect a greater influence of sensory evidence, relative to the confidence in beliefs 
about the (hidden) state of the urn (Speechley et al., 2010; Moutoussis et al., 2011). It is this 
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sensitivity to confidence or precision during evidence accumulation that we wanted to 
understand more formally. 
 
Methods 
An active inference model of evidence accumulation 
We previously described a variational Bayesian scheme for updating posterior beliefs based 
upon a generic model of (finite horizon) Markovian decision processes (Friston et al., 2013). 
The inversion of this model – and the biological plausibility of the belief updates and 
message passing required for model inversion – has previously been discussed in terms of 
planning and perception (Friston et al., 2013; Schwartenbeck et al., 2014). A key aspect of 
this scheme is that choices are sampled from posterior beliefs about control states, which 
(by definition) possess a confidence or precision (inverse variability). Crucially, this means 
that both the beliefs and their precision have to be optimised to minimise variational free 
energy. In previous work, we showed how this optimisation can proceed using standard 
(approximate Bayesian) inference schemes and how these Bayesian update schemes might 
be realised in the brain. As we will see below, that the expected precision shares many 
features of dopaminergic firing and, heuristically, can be understood as the confidence that 
desired outcomes will follow from the current state.  
In active inference, desired outcomes or goals are simply states that, a priori, an agent 
believes they will attain. This means that a particular policy is more likely (and therefore 
valuable) if it minimises the difference between expected and desired outcomes. We have 
previously discussed this difference or divergence in terms of novelty (entropy) and 
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expected utility – where utility is defined as the logarithm of prior beliefs about final 
outcomes that an agent expects (Friston et al., 2013). 
To understand how this formulation of choice behaviour pertains to evidence accumulation, 
all we need to do is to specify the generative model for an appropriate (e.g., urn) task. Once 
specified, one can then use standard (variational Bayes) inversion to simulate observed 
behaviour and examine the dependence of that behaviour on the key parameters of the 
generative model (the Matlab routines required to do this are available an academic 
freeware from http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Furthermore, we can use the model to 
predict observed choice behaviour and therefore estimate model parameters to phenotype 
any given subject in computational terms (see appendix). 
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Figure 1: This figure illustrates the dependencies among hidden states and control states of 
a generative model of choice behaviour. Left panel: these equations specify the generative 
model in terms of the joint probability over observations, the states causing these 
observations and the precision of prior beliefs about those states. The form of these 
equations rests upon Markovian or independence assumptions about controlled state 
transitions. Right panel: The dependencies among these variables are depicted on the right. 
This Bayesian graph illustrates the dependencies among successive hidden states and how 
they depend upon past and future control states. Note that future control states (policies) 
depend upon the current state, because policies depend upon relative entropy or 
divergence between distributions over the final state that are, and are not, conditioned on 
the current state. The resulting choices depend upon the precision of beliefs about control 
states, which in turn depend upon the parameters of the model. Observed outcomes 
depend on, and only on, the hidden states at any given time. Given this generative model, 
an agent can make inferences about observed outcomes using standard (variational Bayes) 
schemes for approximate Bayesian inference (see next figure). See (Friston et al., 2013) for 
further details. 
  
The generative model 
The general form of the model is provided in Figure 1. This figure illustrates the 
dependencies among hidden states 
0{ , , }ts s s and control states { , , }t Tu u u  that the 
agent uses to predict observations or outcomes 0{ , , }to o o . The equations on the left 
specify the model in terms of the joint probability over observations, the states causing 
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these observations and  , the precision of prior beliefs about these states. The form of the 
equations rests upon Markovian or independence assumptions about controlled state 
transitions and can be expressed in terms of the likelihood (top panel), empirical priors 
(middle panels) and full priors (bottom panel).  
The meaning of these variables is summarised on the right in terms of a directed acyclic 
graphical model. This illustrates the dependencies among successive hidden states and how 
they depend upon past and future control states. Note that future control states 
(alternative policies) depend upon the current state. This is because (the agent believes 
that) policies depend upon the relative entropy or divergence between distributions over 
the final state that are, and are not, conditioned on the current state (between empirical 
priors and full priors). The resulting choices depend upon the precision of beliefs about 
control states, which, in turn depend upon the parameters of the model. Finally, observed 
outcomes depend on, and only on, the hidden states at any given time. Given this 
generative model, one can simulate inferences about observed outcomes – and consequent 
choices – using standard (variational Bayes) schemes for approximate Bayesian inference.  
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Figure 2: This figure illustrates the cognitive and functional anatomy implied by the 
variational Bayesian inversion of the generative model in the previous figure. Here, we have 
associated the Bayesian updates of expected states with perception, of future control states 
(policies) within action selection and, finally, expected precision with evaluation. The forms 
of these updates show that sufficient statistics from each set of variables are passed among 
each other until convergence to an internally consistent (Bayes optimal) solution. In terms 
of neuronal implementation, this might be likened to the exchange of neuronal signals via 
extrinsic connections among functionally specialised brain systems. In this schematic, we 
have associated perception (inference about the current state of the world) with the 
prefrontal cortex, while assigning action selection to the basal ganglia. Crucially, precision 
has been associated with dopaminergic projections from ventral tegmental area and 
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substantia nigra that, necessarily, project to both cortical (perceptual) and subcortical 
(action selection) systems. See (Friston et al., 2013) for further details. The precise form of 
this model, and the anatomical mappings implied in the figure, are not mean to be 
definitive, but we present them to illustrate the underlying plausibility of our simple 
scheme. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the cognitive and functional anatomy suggested by the variational 
Bayesian inversion of the generative model above. Here, we have associated the Bayesian 
updates of expected hidden states with perception, of expected control states with action 
selection and, finally, expected precision with evaluation. The forms of these updates show 
that sufficient statistics from each set of variables are passed among each other until 
convergence to an internally consistent (approximately Bayes optimal) solution. In terms of 
neuronal implementation, this might be likened to the exchange of neuronal signals via 
extrinsic connections among functionally specialised brain systems. In this (purely iconic) 
schematic, we have associated perception (inference about the current state of the world) 
with the prefrontal cortex, while assigning action selection to the basal ganglia. Crucially, 
precision has been associated with activity in dopaminergic projections from ventral 
tegmental area and substantia nigra that, necessarily, project to both cortical (perceptual) 
and subcortical (action selection) systems. See (Friston et al., 2013) for further details. 
The ABC of evidence accumulation 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the generative model (and associated belief updating) is specified 
by three sorts of matrices. The first A  constitutes the parameters of the likelihood model 
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and encodes the probability of an outcome, given a hidden state. The second, ( )tuB  
specifies the probabilistic transitions among hidden states that depend upon the current 
control state. Finally, the vector C  encodes the prior probability that a final outcome will be 
observed – where the logarithm of this probability corresponds to the utility of each final 
(hidden) state. The Q  matrix is a function of these parameters (Friston et al., 2013) and 
represents the value of a particular policy from the current state – as measured by the 
relative entropy or divergence between the distribution over final states under that policy 
and the desired distribution encoded by the utility. This leads to the question of what these 
three sets of parameters look like for the urn task. 
 
Figure 3: This figure illustrates the construction of the model for the urn task. As described 
in the main text, this has three main components. Upper panel: the likelihood maps from 
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the hidden states to observations. Here, we assume that all attributes of hidden states are 
available for observation apart from the state of the urn, which can contain a 
preponderance of red or green balls. This means that for every observed state there are two 
hidden states – one for a red urn and one for the green urn. Middle panel: for every control 
state there is a probability transition matrix. Here there are three control states wait, or 
choose red and green. If the agent waits, the number of drawn balls increases by one and 
the number of green balls increases (or not) probabilistically, depending upon whether the 
hidden state corresponds to a red or green urn. If the agent makes a decision, then the 
hidden state jumps from an undecided to declaring red or green, having witnessed the 
previous outcomes. Lower panel: prior beliefs about policies or sequences of control states 
are based upon goals encoded by the utility. Here, the utility reflects a confident decision – 
defined as a log odds ratio of greater than three, when comparing the accumulated 
evidence under the appropriate hidden urn state, relative to the other. Here,   denotes a 
Kronecker tensor product. The graphics depict a subset of hidden states encoding the 
number of drawn balls, the number of green balls, the choice (undecided, red or green) and 
the hidden state of the urn (red or green). 
 
The first thing that needs to be resolved is the nature of hidden states. In this paper, we will 
assume hidden states have four attributes or dimensions that contain all the necessary 
information to define the utility of final states. We will assume that all attributes of hidden 
states are available for observation apart from the (hidden) state of the urn, which can 
contain a preponderance of red or green balls. These attributes include the total number of 
draws, the total number of green balls, the decision (undecided, red or green) and the true 
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state of the urn (a red urn or a green urn). Notice that the size of this state space is much 
smaller than the number of possible outcomes; in the sense that it grows quadratically with 
the number of draws (as opposed to exponentially). Equipped with this state space, it is now 
relatively simple to specify the ( , , )A B C  of the model: 
Figure 3 illustrates these contingencies. ( )A  Upper panel: this shows the likelihood mapping 
from hidden states to observations. This mapping simply says that for every observed state 
there are two hidden states – one for the red urn and one for the green urn. ( )B Middle 
panel: this shows for every control state there is a probability transition matrix. Here, there 
are three control states: wait, choose red or choose green. If the agent waits, the number of 
drawn balls increases by one and the number of green balls can either stay the same or 
increase. The probability of these alternatives depends upon whether the hidden state is a 
red or a green urn. If the agent decides, then the hidden state jumps from an undecided to a 
red or green decision – having seen k  green balls out of n  balls. ( )C  Lower panel: prior 
beliefs about policies or sequences of control states are based upon goals encoded by their 
utility. 
 Here, utility reflects an informed decision – defined as a log odds ratio of greater than 3 
, when comparing the probability of observed outcomes under the appropriate hidden 
state, relative to the alternative. Simple binomial theory shows that this ratio is just 
(2 )k n   , where ln( ) ln(1 )p p     reflects the imbalance in the proportion p  of red 
or green balls in the urn (in this paper       ). Note that when 2k n  or 0  , the log 
odds ratio is zero. In other words, when half the drawn balls are green, or the urn contains 
an equal number of red and green balls, the log odds ratio is always zero. Here,     
controls the sensitivity to a significant odds ratio which is taken to mean a log odds ratio of 
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three or more, corresponding to an odds ratio of 20 to 1 – roughly analogous to a p-value of 
0.05. Having specified the generative model, with standard gamma priors on precision of 
 (   )   (       ), we can now use the variational Bayesian updates in Figure 2 to 
simulate responses to any sequence of draws. 
Finally, sampling costs can be incorporated into prior beliefs by subtracting a penalty n w  
from the utility of each state in the   matrix, where   is the fixed cost of drawing a further 
ball. We ignore sampling cost (   ) unless otherwise stated. 
Results 
A simulated game 
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Figure 4: This figure shows the results of a simulation of an eight draw game. Upper left: 
these show the inferred hidden states as a function of trial or draws. In this example, all the 
drawings returned green balls, apart from the fourth ball which was red. The image scale on 
the right of the graph indicates those final states that have a high utility or prior probability. 
Here, the agent was prevented from deciding until the last draw, where it chooses green. 
We delayed the decision to reveal the posterior beliefs about policies shown on the upper 
right: the solid lines correspond to the posterior expectation of waiting (blue) or deciding 
(red or green respectively). The dotted lines show the equivalent beliefs at earlier times. 
These probabilities are based upon the posterior expectations about policies shown in the 
middle two panels. Middle left: these are the allowable policies which, in this example, allow 
a decision at each of the eight trials. The corresponding posterior expectations are shown in 
the middle right panel in image format. It shows a progressive increase in the eighth policy 
that corresponds to a green choice on the final trial. The lower panels show the expected 
precision over trials. Lower left shows the precision (γ) as a function of variational updates 
(eight per trial). Simulated dopamine responses are shown on the lower left. These are the 
updates after deconvolution with an exponentially decaying kernel of eight updates. Both 
expected precision and simulated dopamine responses show increases after sampling 
information reinforcing currently held beliefs (here drawing a green ball after the first trial), 
and a decrease when sampling conflicting information (when a red ball is drawn on trial 
four). 
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Figure 4 shows the results of simulated eight draw game: the upper right panel shows the 
inferred hidden states as a function of trial or draws. In this example, all the draws returned 
green balls apart from the fourth ball, which was red. The image bar on the right of the 
graph indicates those final states that have a high utility or prior probability. Here, the agent 
was prevented from deciding until the last draw, when it chooses green. We delayed the 
decision to reveal the posterior beliefs about policies shown on the upper right: the solid 
lines correspond to the posterior expectation of waiting (blue) or deciding (red or green 
respectively). The dotted lines show the equivalent beliefs at earlier draws. We see here 
that beliefs about decisions fluctuate as evidence is accumulated with an increasing 
propensity to choose green as more green balls are drawn. Notice that an initial increase in 
the posterior probability of choosing green decreases after a red ball is drawn on the fourth 
draw; however, it recovers quickly with subsequent green draws. These probabilities are 
based upon the posterior expectations about policies that are shown in the middle two 
panels. The allowable policies are shown on the left and, in this example, considered 
decisions at all eight draws. The corresponding posterior expectations are shown in the 
middle right panel in image format. It can be seen that there is a progressive increase in the 
expected probability of the eighth policy – that corresponds to a green choice on the 
penultimate draw.  
The lower panels show the expected precision over trials. The lower left panel shows the 
precision as a function of variational updates (eight per trial), while simulated dopamine 
responses are shown on the lower right. These are the updates after deconvolution with an 
exponentially decaying kernel of eight updates. The interesting thing about these simulated 
responses is that there is a positive dopamine response to the occurrence of each 
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subsequent green ball – with the exception of the fourth (red) ball that induces a transient 
decrease in expected precision. Intuitively, these changes in expected precision reflect the 
confidence in making an informed decision, which increases with confirmatory and 
decreases with contradictory evidence. This is reminiscent of dopaminergic responses to the 
omission of expected rewards, if we regard a green ball as the expected outcome under 
posterior beliefs about the world. Indeed, the most pronounced (phasic) increase in 
precision occurs after the eighth draw – after which the agent declares its decision. 
 
Cognitive phenotypes 
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Figure 5: these simulated results illustrate the effects of increasing the threshold criterion 
for decision (top row), prior precision (middle row) and sampling cost (bottom row) on the 
propensity to make an early decision. Upper panels: these show the probability of deciding 
as a function of the number of draws (latency) for increasing the decision threshold (from 0 
to 8). The left panel shows the effects in terms of the probability of deciding, given no 
previous decision, the middle panel shows the corresponding distribution over latencies to a 
choice, and the right panel shows the cumulative probability of making a decision. (Lower 
thresholds are indicated by darker grey lines). Increasing the threshold or evidence required 
for a confident decision effectively delays the decision. Middle panels: these show the 
equivalent results when increasing the scale parameter of the prior beliefs about precision 
(from 2 to 16). (Lower prior precision values are indicated by darker grey lines) As 
confidence in policy selection increases, there is again a tendency to wait for more 
evidence. Bottom panels: these show the results when increasing the cost to sample   
(from 0 to 1/8). (Lower sampling costs are indicated by darker grey lines) As sampling costs 
increase, the agent tends to decide at earlier time points.   
 
In the above simulations, we assumed particular values for the priors on precision, the 
threshold 3   defining an outcome as informative and other model parameters. Clearly, 
there are a whole range of Bayes optimal behaviours (where optimality is defined relative to 
the agent’s generative model), depending upon the values of these parameters (Mathys et 
al., 2011). The premise behind this sort of modelling is that one can characterise any given 
subject in terms of parameters – that generally encode their prior beliefs. In this section, we 
look at some characteristic behavioural expressions of changes in key model parameters. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the effects of increasing threshold criterion for decision – top row: 
(0, 8)   and prior precision – middle row: (2, 8)   on the propensity to make an 
early decision. The upper panels show the probability of deciding as a function of the 
number of draws (latency) when increasing the log odds ratio criterion that is regarded as 
having a high utility. The left panel shows the effects in terms of the probability of deciding 
given no previous decision, the middle panel shows the corresponding distribution over 
latencies to decide, and the right panel shows the cumulative probability of making a 
decision. Increasing the threshold or evidence required for a confident decision in general 
delays the decision. Interestingly however, early on in the game, agents with very high 
thresholds are more likely to decide than agents with intermediate thresholds. This follows 
from a low expected precision, because (they believe) it is unlikely that they can make a 
confident decision. It is relatively unlikely, for example, that all eight balls will be one colour 
– and the agent knows that at the beginning of the game.  
This highlights the nature of precision and its intimate relationship with utility. Put simply, 
precision reports the confidence in optimistic beliefs about outcomes and choice. Any 
evidence that precludes a high utility outcome renders those optimistic beliefs untenable 
and therefore their precision falls. Heuristically – in terms of minimising surprise or free 
energy – this is like accepting a goal cannot be achieved and telling yourself you did not 
really know if you could have achieved it anyway. 
The middle panels show the equivalent effects upon beliefs when increasing the (scale 
parameter of) prior precision. As confidence about policies increase, there is again a 
tendency to wait for more evidence. This reflects the fact that the relative utility of making 
an informed and correct decision becomes greater, relative to making an incorrect decision. 
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Notice that even with very low precisions, it is always better to wait for as many draws as 
possible – to ensure the greatest number of possible outcomes. This reflects the entropy or 
novelty part of the relative entropy or divergence that makes policies valuable 
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2013). The effect of varying prior precision on impulsivity is 
particularly interesting, given the proposal that precision is encoded by dopaminergic 
activity in the midbrain and the fact that dopaminergic abnormalities are implicated in a 
number of psychopathologies (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Howes and Kapur, 2009; Steeves 
et al., 2010; Adams et al., 2013). 
The costs of accumulating extra information are an additional factor that agents must 
consider when modelling their environment. These can be implicit, for example the extra 
effort or attentional resources required to perform the task for longer, or explicit, as in 
formulations of the urn task – in which subjects are penalised for each extra bead they 
choose to draw. From the perspective of active inference, this penalty is simply a prior belief 
that the agent will decide sooner rather than later. Figure 5 (bottom row) shows the effects 
of increasing costs on postponing decisions. Costs were varied from   (      ⁄ ). As 
expected, when the cost of accumulating more information increases, the agent tends to 
choose earlier. 
 
Discussion 
We have considered evidence accumulation from the perspective of active inference using a 
recently proposed framework for inference within the context of Markov decision processes 
(Friston et al., 2013). Here, agents expect to make informed decisions, and sample 
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information in order to fulfil this belief. We show that by simply specifying three matrices 
(the ABC of evidence accumulation) it is possible to simulate plausible behaviour in the 
widely used urn task. Our model also provides testable predictions about the relationship 
between the outcomes of specific trials and expected precision, which we hypothesise is 
encoded by activity in the dopaminergic midbrain. In addition, we briefly show how varying 
the parameters of an agent’s generative model leads to different (but, from the agent’s 
perspective) equally optimal patterns of behaviour. This framework allows us to consider 
how changes in model parameters might induce reflection impulsivity, which characterises a 
number of psychopathologies such as schizophrenia  (Huq et al., 1988; Garety et al., 1991; 
Fear and Healy, 1997; Moritz and Woodward, 2005; Clark et al., 2006; Corcoran et al., 2008; 
Moutoussis et al., 2011). 
 
The distinction between optimal inference conditioned on an agent’s model of the 
environmental contingencies and that conditioned on the ‘true’ contingencies (as known to 
the experimenter) is important to stress. This distinction allows normal and pathological 
variations in behaviour to result from inferential processes, which are themselves equally 
close to optimal. This reconciles a Bayesian view of cognition with the fact that human 
behaviour is, in many situations, manifestly non-optimal relative to the true nature of the 
environment. Prior work has considered how variations in observed behaviour can result 
from optimal inference, when the parameters governing estimates of environmental 
volatility (Mathys et al., 2011; Vossel et al., 2013) and sensory precision (Adams et al., 2012; 
Brown et al., 2013) are altered. The simulations presented here thus join an increasingly 
large literature seeking to explain inter-individual differences in terms of optimal inference.  
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Previous modelling work has considered behaviour on the urn task in terms of Bayesian 
inference (Averbeck et al., 2011; Moutoussis et al., 2011), or presented approaches to 
evidence accumulation during perceptual decision-making that bear similarities to that 
taken here. Huang and Rao formulate evidence accumulation as a Partially Observable 
Markov Decision Process, solved using dynamical programming (in this case value iteration) 
(Huang and Rao, 2013). Drugowitsch et al. take a similar approach, to produce a hybrid 
model combining dynamic programming with drift diffusion models to capture collapsing 
bounds (Drugowitsch et al., 2012). Deneve also considers evidence accumulation in the light 
of optimal inference, focussing particularly upon the necessity to infer the reliability of 
sensory information (a consideration that is less pressing in the urn task that we consider 
here, but crucial in perceptual decision-making paradigms such as the random-dot motion 
task) (Deneve, 2012). Our approach differs from – and extends – these models in a number 
of crucial respects. By considering behaviour in terms of active inference, we were able to 
specify planning and behaviour as purely inferential processes, obviating the need to include 
a value function over and above the agent’s beliefs about the world. This effaces the 
distinction between reward and non-reward based decision-making, as exemplified by the 
time course of expected precision, which shows reward prediction error-like dynamics even 
in absence of reward. Our model also goes beyond previous work in that we consider how 
the agent actually performs inference, namely through (Variational Bayesian) message 
passing. Variational inference is both efficient and neurobiologically plausible, and also 
motivates natural, if simplified, hypotheses about how the brain regions encodes different 
quantities in the model, an essential step in relating impulsivity to underlying 
neuropathology.  
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Variational Bayes mandates a partition between different classes of model parameters (the 
mean field approximation), each of which are updated only according to the expectations of 
the parameters in the other subsets (Attias, 2000; Beal, 2003). This motivates and explains 
both functional segregation (Zeki et al., 1991) (since subsets are conditionally independent 
of one another) and functional integration (Friston, 2002) (since updating requires message 
passing between subsets) (Friston, 2010). The particular structure of our model suggests a 
natural (though necessarily caricatured) assignment of observed, hidden and control states 
to sensory, prefrontal and striatal regions respectively (Figure 2). It also requires that 
expected precision over control states be encoded by a system that projects widely and 
reciprocally to – and has a modulatory (multiplicative) effect upon – regions supporting 
perception and action selection (Figure 2) (Friston et al., 2014). This profile fits easily with 
characteristics of the dopaminergic system, which heavily innervates the striatum and 
prefrontal cortex (Seamans, 2007), and exerts a modulatory influence on postsynaptic 
potentials (Smiley et al., 1994; Krimer et al., 1997; Yao et al., 2008; Friston et al., 2012). 
Despite its advantages, variational inference is only an approximation to Bayes-optimal 
inference, and under certain conditions may diverge significantly from true optimality. This 
has the potential to furnish interesting predictions about behaviour, something that could 
usefully be explored in future work. 
 
At the same time we note that the fundamentally interactive nature of message-passing 
between functional modules in our model may relate to the multiple, specific brain modules 
known to be affected by disorders resulting in reflection impulsivity. In psychosis research, 
for example, it has long been hypothesized that dopaminergic abnormalities affect, and are 
exacerbated by, impaired prefrontal cortical function (Laruelle, 2008). Indeed, while gross 
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measures of reflection impulsivity such as draws-to-decision are normalized by 
antidopaminergic therapy  (Menon et al., 2008), the finer statistical structure of decision 
making in the Urns task is not (Moutoussis et al., 2011). This is likely to reflect the fact that 
remission from psychosis in people with schizophrenia compensates function by increasing 
some parameters, such as the decision threshold parameter κ, and possibly the gross 
statistics of precision (γ), but it may not normalize the fine structure of the cortical-
subcortical interactions that would normally compute γ.  In support of this, recent imaging 
and lesion studies of the Urns task (Furl and Averbeck, 2011; Lunt et al., 2012) highlighted 
the importance of a lateral-prefrontal – parietal network in preventing hasty decisions, even 
in the absence of psychosis. This was contrasted with activation of a network involving the 
ventral striatum and a variety of cortical areas associated with the actual decision to stop 
sampling further information. Along similar lines, relatively subtle hasty decision making in 
the Urns task in Parkinson's disease has been attributed to ventral striatal 
hyperdopaminergia while more severe deficits associated with impulsive-compulsive 
syndromes in parkinsonism have been attributed to cortico (-striatal) pathology 
(Djamshidian et al., 2012).   
 
The hypothesis that dopamine encodes expected precision is also supported by the 
characteristic time course of expected precision during evidence accumulation, which shows 
a pattern similar to that observed in dopaminergic neurons in response to omitted and 
expected reward (Schultz et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 2012). Consistent with this, it has been 
shown that activity in the ventral tegmental area increases during performance of the urn 
task – relative to a control condition – and that this activity peaks at the time of decision 
(resembling the peak phasic activity just prior to choice in our model (Figure 4)) (Esslinger et 
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al., 2013). We have also recently shown, in the context of a limited offer game, that 
midbrain activity strongly reflects trial-by-trial fluctuations in expected precision 
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2014). A large body of work seeks to explain (phasic) dopamine 
function in terms of reinforcement learning, and reward prediction errors in particular 
(Schultz et al., 1997; Frank et al., 2004; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Waltz et al., 2007) though see 
(Shiner et al., 2012). Given that the urn task involves inference (on hidden states) rather 
than learning (about model parameters), a putative role of dopamine in learning is unlikely 
to be of direct relevance here. Moreover, although expected precision will undoubtedly 
influence learning as well as inference, the model considered here does not treat learning, 
and it is thus difficult to draw direct comparisons with existing literature on dopamine and 
reward learning. This is an issue we intend to explore in future, by incorporating parameter 
learning within out framework.    
 
A link between dopamine and precision is of particular interest here given that both 
dopaminergic abnormalities and increased reflection impulsivity are known to be features of 
schizophrenia (Moritz and Woodward, 2005; Howes and Kapur, 2009; Moutoussis et al., 
2011). In our scheme, reducing prior precision leads to earlier decisions (Figure 5), which 
suggests that impaired dopaminergic neuromodulation may underlie the increased 
impulsivity observed in patients with schizophrenia. To our knowledge this is the first 
hypothesis which provides a mechanistic explanation for how impulsivity emerges out of a 
likely pathophysiology in schizophrenia. We intend to explore this in future empirical work, 
but note that explaining increased impulsivity in terms of decreased precision fits nicely with 
previous work by Moutoussis et al. These authors suggested that increased impulsivity in 
schizophrenic patients arises not from increased sensitivity to the costs of gathering new 
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information, but rather from increased stochasticity (what they describe as ‘cognitive noise’) 
in planning and choice behaviour (Moutoussis et al., 2011). This is exactly what our scheme 
predicts. Our findings also bear a striking resemblance to previous work suggesting that 
behavioural differences across three different tasks between impulsive and non-impulsive 
Parkinson’s disease patients can be explained by increasing uncertainty about obtaining 
future rewards (Averbeck et al., 2013). In one sense, the main contribution of the work 
presented here is to provide a principled framework within which to understand findings of 
this sort – and to derive plausible and testable hypotheses about the pathophysiology that 
may underlie them. 
  
An interesting phenomenon highlighted by our simulations is the degeneracy of reflection 
impulsivity, when this is simply taken to mean hasty decision-making. Since the amount of 
information sampled prior to making a decision can be altered by several parameters in the 
agent’s generative model (Figure 5), there is no one-to-one mapping between reflection 
impulsivity as a behavioural trait and the parameters of the model. This suggests that 
understanding the mechanisms that give rise even to an apparently simple trait such as 
reflection impulsivity necessarily requires careful model-based analysis of both behaviour 
and its neural correlates. Such model-based analysis is likely to become increasingly 
important both for characterising the mechanisms that give rise to inter-individual 
differences in behaviour, and for improving diagnostic criteria in psychiatry (Montague et 
al., 2012).   
It is interesting to consider whether the precise patterns of behaviour underlying reflection 
impulsivity are similar across different patient groups (for example, in psychosis (Moutoussis 
 27 
et al., 2011), Parkinson’s disease (Djamshidian et al., 2012; Averbeck et al., 2013) and other 
disorders (Lunt et al., 2012)). To the extent that these disorders are characterised by altered 
dopaminergic function, our model predicts similar behavioural changes. However, it is also 
possible that specific disease features play a role, particularly given the multiplicity of 
potential routes to impulsivity discussed above corresponding to the differences, rather 
than similarities, between the panel rows of Fig. 5. In fact, the particular strength in 
inverting individual (generative) models of a task lies in the potential identification of 
characteristic parameter configurations of a specific patient group that may induce the 
same overt behaviour. More specifically, the underlying causes of impulsivity in patients 
with Parkinson’s disease, addiction or psychosis are likely to differ, even though the 
behavioural consequences in a task may be the same. In the particular setting of this model, 
this translates into the fact that on the one hand, impulsive and hasty behaviour can have 
various causes such as decreased prior precision or negative expectations about transition 
probabilities and, on the other hand, aberrant precision can have different effects 
depending on the context, such as on action selection, perception or policy. Addressing this 
requires fitting the model to data collected from different patient groups, which we hope to 
carry out in the near future. A similar comment applies to the relationship between 
delusions and impulsivity (Fear and Healy, 1997; Moritz and Woodward, 2005; Menon et al., 
2008), given that delusions are common in schizophrenia patients, but less common in other 
groups that also show increased impulsivity. Delusions might depend upon the 
dopaminergic abnormalities also found in other disorders, but emerge only in the particular 
context of a schizophrenia pathology. Alternatively, there may be specific mechanisms 
underlying delusions that relate to (reflection) impulsivity in ways that are indirectly related 
to dopaminergic function. For example, reduced precision at the relevant cognitive level 
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might contribute to down-grading evidence against a delusion which otherwise has great 
personal significance. 
In general, the active inference framework considered here explains stochastic action 
selection as resulting from agents seeking to minimise surprise (variational free energy), 
rather than maximise the value of their actions. This means that the precision term which 
governs the sensitivity of action to the utility of different policies must itself be optimised, 
based on an agent’s confidence in attaining desirable states (an extremely large precision 
term would lead the agent to deterministically select the action with greatest utility) 
(Friston et al., 2013). This provides a principled explanation for stochastic choice behaviour 
which does not need recourse to noise or temperature parameters in the decision rule 
governing choice (Daw et al., 2006; FitzGerald et al., 2009). In the context of the urn task, 
free energy minimisation explains why agents do not always choose to sample until the last 
possible opportunity, even when the cost of acquiring more evidence is set to zero (Figure 
5). 
 
One limitation of our approach is that it only considers processes that occur in discrete time, 
whereas the brain, as a dynamical system, functions in continuous time. This criticism can 
be mitigated by the observation that the solutions that variational updates converge to the 
same solutions that would be found through gradient descent methods. These gradient 
descent schemes can be implemented as (biologically plausible) Bayesian filtering or 
predictive coding (Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005; Friston et al., 2007, 2008). This means that 
while our discrete time models are further abstracted from brain function than models we 
have considered elsewhere (for example (Adams et al., 2012; Friston et al., 2012)) they are 
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still capable of embodying mechanistic hypotheses about cognition, which is essential if we 
want to relate model parameters to neurobiology. Discrete versus continuous time 
formulations of evidence accumulation are important because evidence accumulation is a 
general problem in inference – that goes beyond the discrete trial, binomial task considered 
here. In future work, we will consider how evidence accumulation might be performed 
through free energy minimisation when the agent is presented with a stream of continuous, 
graded evidence as in the random-dot motion paradigm (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). 
 
In summary, we have considered evidence accumulation on the urn task in terms of active 
inference using a generic variational scheme.  By specifying a generative model of the 
agent’s beliefs about the causal structure of the environment – together with its beliefs 
about which states it expects to end up in – we were able to simulate plausible decision-
making behaviour. In addition, the partitioning of model parameters required by variational 
Bayes naturally motivates hypotheses about which brain regions or systems might encode 
particular parameters. Expected precision, which we hypothesise is encoded by 
dopaminergic firing, plays a key role in modulating impulsivity, leading one to hypothesise 
that dopaminergic dysfunction may underlie the behavioural changes observed in 
schizophrenia, and perhaps other disorders. Our simulations demonstrate the power and 
flexibility of the active inference framework and generate plausible hypotheses for future 
investigation.   
 
 
Appendix 
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An important application of the Markovian scheme described in the main text is to 
parameterise or phenotype individual subjects in terms of key model parameters that have 
both a computational and putative neurobiological meaning. This computational 
phenotyping rests on estimating model parameters from observed behaviour. This is 
relatively simple to do with Markovian models because they provide the probability of any 
allowable action at any point in time. This means the probability of observed choices can be 
computed for any given model parameter, using simulations of the sort described above. By 
searching over ranges of parameters the ensuing log likelihood functions serve to estimate 
the model parameters that best explain a particular subject’s behaviour. 
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Figure A1: Results of a simulated estimation of model parameters. In this example, eight 
games were simulated and the outcomes (and choices) were used to evaluate the decision 
probability under different values of prior precision. Upper left: the observed distribution of 
latencies over the eight games. Upper right: the log likelihood of obtaining the choice 
behaviour under different levels of the prior precision (from 2 to 16), with one function for 
each games. Lower left: because the choices from the eight games were conditionally 
independent, the total log likelihood is the sum of log likelihoods from each game. Under 
the (Laplace) assumption that the posterior distribution over prior precision is Gaussian, one 
can use the log likelihood to estimate the posterior expectation and precision of the model 
parameter. In this case, the scale parameter of the priors over precision had a true value of 
eight (vertical line). 
 
Figure A1 shows the results of a simulated estimation of model parameters. In this example, 
eight games were simulated and the outcomes (and choices) were used to evaluate the 
probability of choice behaviour under different values of prior precision (2, 16)  . The 
observed distribution of latencies over the eight games is shown on the upper left, while the 
corresponding log likelihood of obtaining the choice behaviour is shown on the lower left – 
as a function of the prior precision, for each of the eight trials. Because the outcomes from 
the eight games were conditionally independent, their log likelihood is the sum of log 
likelihoods from each game. Under the (Laplace) assumption that the posterior distribution 
over prior precision is Gaussian, one can now use the log likelihood to estimate the 
posterior expectation and precision of the model parameter. In this case, the scale 
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parameter of the priors over precision and had a true value of four (vertical line) – which 
was estimated accurately. 
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